

Contemporary Civil-Military Relations

Ivan MAJCHÚT

Security and Defence Department, Armed Forces Academy of Gen. M. R. Štefánik, Demänová 393, 031 01, Liptovský Mikuláš, Slovakia

Correspondence: ivan.majchut@aos.sk;

Abstract

Civil-military relations are still an under-researched area in relation to the existence and deployment of armed forces. However, it is the factor that significantly influences the management of the state and the use of relevant power tools, including the armed forces. The aim of this paper is to carry out research of the fundamental factors affecting the establishment, deployment and control of armed forces. The research was carried out using the methods of analysis, synthesis, comparison, abstraction, deduction and prediction. It was found that in democratic states there is a legislative framework for the establishment, deployment and control of armed forces. However, each state has its peculiarities. Their mutual understanding is important especially in multinational operations. This can help in reducing differences of opinions and in achieving both political synergy and military interoperability. This paper can assist both civilian and military officials in understanding their place in civil-military relations and their competencies in managing the armed forces.

KEY WORDS: *civil-military relations, democratic control, professional control, military personnel*

Citation: Majchút, I. (2024). Contemporary civil-military relations. In Proceedings of the Challenges to National Defence in Contemporary Geopolitical Situation, Brno, Czech Republic, 11-13 September 2024. ISSN 2538-8959. DOI 10.3849/cndcgs.2024.124.

1. Introduction

The roles of civilian leaders of the state and senior military leadership evolved during the history and currently are formulated in the legislative documents. This relationship has implications for the effectiveness of strategic decisions in pursuance of national interests. The military is more than simply a tool to its civilian principals.

Friction between the military establishment and its civilian leadership is not a contemporary phenomenon. The debate concerning civil-military relations has been a fundamental issue for long time and surely in the future it will be as well. Tension between members of the military and civilian leaders existed, exist and will exist. Especially it was visible in the post-communist states in which democratization processes took place. The Central and Eastern European states have put in place the core institutions and practices of democracy, and this is reflected in civil-military relations in these states. This was, among other things, requirement for their accession to the NATO and the EU. The basic signs of friction between the political leadership of the state and the military leadership of the armed forces are also visible in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. It is probably one of the reasons why there was a change in the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The members of these organizations are currently using and planning to use military force in the future. This trend poses fundamental questions about the use of military force in world politics and the relationship between civilian political leaders and the military in shaping when and how force is used.

The intention is to provide a comprehensive and comparative overview of the approaches used in the application of civil-military relations in achieving goals at the strategic, operational and partially tactical level. The author's effort is to achieve a comprehensive view of the considered issue with an emphasis on use in democratic states and organizations.

The author draws on the existing mostly western literature on civil-military relations. The literature used includes, for example, the works of Cottey [1], Krupski [2] or Rapp [3]. The literature cited covers the general topic broadly enough and from different perspectives (e.g., military and/or civilian role in governance, etc.) and was therefore chosen by the author as a starting point. Other authors also deal with issues of civil-military relations. Elischer [4], Dudzevičiūte [5] and Petraitis [6] focus on the specific environment in which civil-military relations apply. This creates good conditions for comparing different approaches to the mentioned issue. Pantev [7] describes basic principles and standards of democratic control of the security sector which is also very fruitful to understand investigated context.

The work of the American author Huntington [8] can be perceived as a capstone work, covering the issue of the position of the soldiers in the state. It brings a critical view at the processes of security and all actors involvement to it including elected representatives of citizens, who play an important role in the civil-military relations. Literature by authors such as Gray [9] and Lynn [10] is useful for understanding the long-term development process of civil-military relations in the context of armed conflicts and wars.

Works by authors such as Balsys [11], Rana [12] and Steed [13] are significant precisely in relation to the military representatives of the essence of the matter. The mentioned authors illustrate it with several examples. Some of the mentioned examples are rather individually processed in the literature and therefore it is necessary to look for a wider context for the use of own research findings. That is the reason why it is necessary to solve the raised problem and pay more attention to it. It is necessary to find a general connection of the rules valid for large players to the conditions of small states. There are, for example, in Central Europe, a large number.

The aim of this paper is to carry out research of the fundamental factors affecting the establishment, deployment and control of armed forces. Due to the theoretical framework of the paper, empirical-analytical methods were used to achieve the goal. Subsequently, synthesis was used. Main functions of the chosen approach were description, classification, abstraction and typology. When processing individual parts of the text, the analysis of the achieved theoretical knowledge as well as empirical conclusions were applied. These were subsequently generalized, and deductions and partial predictions were made.

The supporting methodological approach was the use of a combination of theoretical knowledge and practical experience of the author, using sociological and psychological approaches that were, are and probably will be used in the issue of civil-military relations.

2. Establishment of Armed Forces

The armed forces (AF) are a specific formal social organization that uses armed violence in the interest of the entity that created it and uses it to pursue its political goals. This means that the AF is an instrument of power, and it is not an implementer of power that could decide its size and deployment.

The creator and user of the AF can be:

- the state represented by the highest bodies of state (legislative and executive) power,
- an insurgent organization that acts as a body of the state power (de facto, by rising against the legal government for political reasons, effectively controlling part of the state territory and establishing an independent government power in it - essentially a government) and fighting the central government,
- an international organization that, because of an international agreement of an intergovernmental nature, establishes a joint AF of the contracting parties or disposes of a dedicated part of the AF of the contracting parties.

The specificity of AF consists in the fact that, under the conditions of their legitimate use (decision on their use in accordance with the constitution of the relevant state and the UN Charter) and compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law, it is a legal instrument of armed violence. This means that, subject to compliance with the stated conditions, their members are authorized to kill or injure enemy AF members in battle, damage and destroy their military objects and material.

The AF of a sovereign state was and currently still is one of its basic institutions. As a result of fundamental changes in the security environment, their nature, structure and functions may change, but their main mission remains. The AF is still irreplaceable, the most important and the strongest instrument of the state ensuring its independence, territorial integrity and the integrity of state borders. On a foreign policy scale, they represent the basic symbol of its sovereignty and are the main guarantor of its subjectivity under international law. It is expected that the modern AF will be formed as an institution with strategy, military doctrine, training, education, organization, equipment operations, and tactics to achieve decisive military results [9].

The AF can generally have the following character [14]:

- regular AF,
(permanent, organized and acting according to military regulations)
- irregular AF.
(insurgent armed formations that is under the command of persons responsible for the insurgent organization for the actions of their subordinates and it is subject with an internal disciplinary system)

In this case, the term regular AF becomes synonymous with the term armed forces. Some states consider the term army to be synonymous with the term armed forces. For some countries (especially in the Anglo-Saxon environment), this can cause misunderstanding because they perceive the term only as ground forces, i.e. one of the basic components of the AF. Some militarily strong states perceive the term army in the meaning of a military formation made up of two or more army corps. For that reason, it is appropriate to prefer the term armed forces in general.

The AF of the democratic states is a legal instrument of the state power. The basis of their establishment in a democratic state is usually the constitution of the respective state. The definition of the mission, main tasks and basic structure

of the AF of the relevant state is subsequently defined in a special founding law. For example: in the case of the USA, it is United States Code Title 10 [15], in the case of the Czech Republic it is Zákon č. 219/1999 Sb. o ozbrojených silách České republiky (Law No. 219 of 1999 about Armed Forces of Czech Republic) [16], in case of the Slovak Republic it is Zákon č. 321/2002 Z.z. o ozbrojených silách Slovenskej republiky (Law No. 321 of 2002 about Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic) [17]. The specific situation is in Great Britain, where the parliament adopts a law on the AF every 5 years based on the Bill of Rights from 1689 (1689 Bill of Rights) [18], which allows in peacetime to maintain a standing army only with the express consent of Parliament.

3. Personnel of Armed Forces

The AF of a democratic state is a state institution with a priority purpose of applying legal armed violence against the aggressor. Consequently, the current conflicts between state and non-state actors, which is asymmetric in nature, are even more difficult for regular conventional forces to consider whether and how to use the deadly potential at their disposal [19]. The development and use of non-lethal weapons is also a consideration [20].

Through its activity, the AF produce a public asset, which is the assurance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Based on the above, the AF can be perceived as a production entity that needs adequate human, material and financial resources for its activity.

The AF human resources are referred to as the AF personnel. By this term, we understand the sum of persons who are included in the organizational structure (either peacetime or wartime) of the AF. The AF human resources are created by military and civilian personnel.

3.1. Military Personnel

The military personnel are the main personnel component of the AF. The term "member of the Armed Forces" is synonymous with the term "soldier" in its general meaning. It refers to a person performing military service in uniform, armed and materially equipped in accordance with functional and rank classification.

The essence of the rank hierarchy is the enlistment of soldiers into rank categories: enlisted, non-commissioned officers, and officers (including generals). The officer corps is the key military personnel for organizing the activities of the AF. Accordingly, it is destined to perform command and control functions and in all militarily advanced states it is made up of professional soldiers.

Members of the AF in the categories of enlisted and non-commissioned officers are mostly direct performers of combat and non-combat activities and are partly commanders of the smallest military units. The long-term trend is to reduce the number of other soldiers to one officer. This phenomenon can be explained primarily by the increase in the share of officers in the exploitation of modern weapon systems and by the increase in the number of smaller, independently operating units under the command of junior officers.

In addition to rank classification, the enlistment of military personnel into active duty and reserve soldiers is also applied. Depending on whether it is professional or conscription AF, all soldiers in active duty are professional soldiers, or part of them are professional soldiers and part of them are soldiers performing compulsory military service. The nature of the AF affects the creation of mobilization reserves. The advantage of professional AF is the lower need for financial resources for the training of soldiers in active service, but the lower number of reserves. On the contrary, the advantage of conscription AF is a relatively high proportion of reserve formation, but with a higher frequency of personnel training and thus a higher need for financial resources.

Skills, health, education, and training can be evaluated as the key factors of the concept to create military personnel. The broader view can include emotional intelligence, work experience, employee well-being, and loyalty to the institution, as well as the social and cultural characteristics. These characteristics are also important for military human capital, as they help to reveal its potential and fulfil an important national duty [5].

To adapt military personnel to the modern conditions of civil-military relations, we must focus primarily on officers in active duty. It means to handle the context of warfare, and another thing is what share of it will be civilian and military matter. It is necessary to perceive that it is not focused only on the development of "uniformed" personnel, but also civilian personnel to ensure the comprehensive security of population at the national, regional and local levels [21].

Activities in power struggle belong to three areas:

- the use of political/diplomatic tools,
- the realization of intelligence/special operations,
- the deployment of the armed forces.

A classical power struggle with the use of foreign affairs, intelligence with hidden activities and uniformed military services is reflected in this hierarchy. The actors of the power struggle have different interests. They are determined to use force, whether military, political or economic, to achieve them [22]. Military power depends not only on manpower, weapons, or resources, but success on the battlefield lies in the mind of soldiers. Military capability depends on personnel with the right qualifications in the right job when we need them there [5].

The main feature of value is that personal interests become more important for individual. This feature is also connected with individual perception of your own place in the community or institution. Nowadays individual needs are

higher than collective commitment. The standards and expectations which rise from institution become inconsistent with service perception of contemporary officers. Aspect of individualism in collective values propagating military institution leads to ambivalent situation. Modern society's structure and social diversity are factors that might become one of the most important challenges for national defence security and policy of personnel in Western countries. Institutional officer's identity remains crucial for national defence tasks implementation because defence tasks always require specific values, attitude and beliefs. Nowadays convergence of civil-military relations might be challenging. Contemporary society trends that are specific with such features as individualistic, hedonistic, liberal values suggests plausible identities foundation for armed forces individuals. Traditional, demanding institutions values become difficult to accept for nowadays officers [11].

Comprehensive use of civilian and military instruments or the creations of new "complex units" under civilian command/control are encouraged. Especially officers must also perceive their place in civil-military relations in this regard [12].

3.2. Civilian Personnel

Civilian personnel are an additional component of AF, which is assigned exclusively to job positions that are not related to combat activity. These are mainly logistical and administrative positions performed outside the area of combat deployment and teaching positions in those military schools that are part of the AF. Such predetermination of the job positions of civilian personnel results from the Geneva Conventions I to IV from 1949 and the additional protocols I and II from 1977 [23]. It follows from their content that only military personnel with the status of "combatant" can participate in armed activities.

According to Article 44, paragraph 4 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, a member of the AF has the status of a combatant on the condition that he complies with the obligation to distinguish himself from a civilian by his clothing (obligation to wear an identification mark visible from a distance) and by publicly carrying a weapon during any military activity. In compliance with these conditions, the combatant:

- has the right to actively participate in hostile activity,
- is entitled to violent acts (killing or injuring combatants of the other side, damaging or destroying military objects and material) if his violent acts do not violate international humanitarian law, his actions have the character of an authorized activity and do not lead to criminal liability,
- represents a legitimate target of attack by enemy combatants,
- has a legal right to the status of a prisoner of war.

On the other hand, from the content of Article 51 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, it follows that a civilian who engages in armed activities loses the right to protection (immunity from attack) and becomes a legal military target. The articles mentioned above are binding on the signatory states of the Geneva Protocols in all cases of international armed conflicts in which they participate, either as direct actors or as a third party (for example, when participating in operations with a UN Security Council mandate to enforce peace). When the AF is deployed in non-combat operations (for example, stabilization or assistance), international humanitarian law does not limit the participation of AF civilian personnel in these activities.

Despite this, the use of civilians (not only AF civilian personnel) is calculated not only in non-combat operations but also in warfare. There are two major reasons for use of civilians in the warfare. One is the fact that they are where the battles are taking place. This is only increase in the future as cities grow even larger and population continues to explode. The second is that there is an innate weakness for higher-tier soldiers seeing death or harm done to an innocent. These two combine to make the use of civilians a very low-risk, high-profit area [13].

Security can contain military, environmental, economic, societal and political sector, or it can be appended by informational, or even also energy sector. It is a subject of discussions [24]. In any case, the military is represented in it, in combination with many others that are of a civilian nature. The challenge is how to connect the mentioned sectors, to determine the overall responsibility as well as the share of responsibility in individual sectors. Preparing military and civilian personnel to work in risk management is a challenge for educational institutions, especially at the university level [25] [26] [27].

4. Position of the Armed Forces in the Structure of the State Institutions

The state stability is given by many factors such as the political system, military capabilities, law enforcement, social and economic stability of the country [28]. Military capabilities undoubtedly occupy an important place in the entire mentioned system. The position of the AF depends on several factors, among which the character of the state in terms of the applied form of government (authoritarian or democratic state) dominates. It determines the position of the AF in the system of state bodies and the applied principles of supervision over the activities of the AF.

Most states have a military as a highly organized, well trained and armed force maintained by them and authorized to play an adequate role in the statehood. In democracies, a principle of a civilian control over the military prevents it from gaining too much influence but one knows examples of military becoming in lead (military junta) and, as an extreme case, dominative and fully influencing all areas of statehood. Historically those extreme cases with the military penetrating "all and everything" are known under a "military state" name [6].

Identifying the position of the AF in the system of state institutions means clarifying the role of the AF in the performance of state functions, i.e. on the performance of activities by which the state realizes its mission. For the state to be recognized by the international community as a sovereign power authority that directs the actions of the population on its territory through law and with the use of power, it must have a system of executive power bodies with the ability to perform the basic functions of the state. Among them is the security function that ensures the security of the state as a whole and its citizens. The security function is complex in nature and its integral part is also the defence function of the state performed with the aim of:

- prevention of the emergence and organized management of a crisis caused by the violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity because of military aggression,
- prevention of the use of armed violence by other state and non-state entities against the vital interests of the respective state.

The main implementer of the defence issues of the state is usually the Ministry of Defence. The main executive institution of the Ministry of Defence is the AF, which operates under the direct subordination of the Ministry of Defence. Usually it acts as a political-strategic, conceptual, standard-setting and administrative body around creation and implementation of defence policy and military-political management of the AF. At the same time, it does not solve the military-professional matters of the AF.

Finding the border between the military-political and military-professional part of AF management is a real challenge for those dealing with security and especially military matters. The challenge is also what kind of persons are in civilian positions (it means in the military-political part) in the mentioned processes. They can be civilians who have a civilian education and have never served in the AF. As a result, they do not have the appropriate experience or knowledge of how military units are working. Their advantage is that they are e.g. experts in security, economy, law, etc. as well as not being encumbered by their ties to the military environment. However, they can also be civilians (former soldiers) who have a military education and served in the AF. Thus, they have the appropriate knowledge and experience of how military units are working. The challenge lies in what ratio of civilians with military experience and without military experience to use in these processes. Even more so because they are all led by persons who emerged from democratic elections and for them the management of the Ministry of Defence is a political matter.

It is in the above-mentioned areas that the space for self-realization of soldiers is offered after the end of their military career. The military must actively prepare for transitions in civilian leadership. Politicians and civilian appointees will require greater involvement at the beginning of their terms. This is not a burden; it is an opportunity. Higher engagement at the onset must have an aim of aligning goals with the newly elected or appointed civilian principals. The fact that many civilian principals now have very little military experience makes this even more important. The military must actively engage its leaders and receive guidance. There is no need to frame threats. Military leaders must understand that their issues may be only one of many national interests their leaders are trying to address [2].

5. Democratic Control of Armed Forces

Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) means the management, supervision and control dimension of the instruments used in connection with the existence of the AF. DCAF belongs among the basic attributes of civil-military relations in democratic states. The need to deal with civil-military relations, or to codify some of their attributes, dates to the 19th century and is related to the emergence of mass armed forces, the professionalization of the officer corps, and the gradual separation of this professional group from civil society.

During the 20th century, democratic control emerged as a doctrinal principle of the relationship between the political bodies of a democratic state and its AF, which defines the indivisible responsibility of the political leadership of the state for strategic decision-making on the construction, development, use of the AF, as well as their resource provision. During the Cold War, especially in the Eastern Bloc, the question of DCAF was not given special attention. The key topic was the question of the potential use of the AF of NATO states in a possible military confrontation with the AF of the Warsaw Pact states. After the end of the Cold War, this question became a dominant topic, especially in connection with the transition of the former communist states to the Western model of democracy. As part of this process, it was necessary to make fundamental changes that would rid the AF of both their subordination to one political party and their privileged position among state institutions in their resource provision [1].

The question of DCAF became critical in connection with the decision of the NATO authorities to include mentioned issue among the determining conditions for joining the Alliance. Paradoxically, even though the Alliance emphasized the DCAF, it did not have a universal model for the application of it. Its creation became the subject of research not only within the Alliance but also in the scientific workplaces of various international security organizations. Democratic civilian oversight of the AF and the entire sector of security, including intelligence are of crucial importance in the process of democratic consolidation of the transition countries. Effective functioning of the security sector turns into a major feature of the democratic society [7].

Since the last two decades, we can see strong difference between Russian and Western attitude to the civil-military relations. Russia is witnessing growing its military involvement into all statehood areas while modern forms of civil-military relations are visible in the Western countries. Today, differently from a majority in the Western countries, Russian military organization remains a follower of Prussian military organization and continues using its culture and philosophy [6].

In both, the idea is to create the homeland and to achieve this through relaying on country's history and tradition. It is promoting by similar state values and virtues (loyalty and devotion to the state, a common-sense patriotism) and proposes efficiency, austerity and discipline to achieve this. A closer look taken at it, we can see difference in democratic and bureaucratic approaches.

Russian system can be characterised as a division of labour, a clearly defined organisational hierarchy, detailed rules and regulations including a way of working, a personnel selection, carrier policies and impersonal relationships in the organisation. All these characteristics are so well presented, imbedded and followed in Russian military organization.

On the other side, the purpose of DCAF is to apply such a principle of relations between the political representation of the state and the AF, which is intended to prevent the risk of a military coup and, on the other hand, to prevent them from becoming a liberal organization without strict military discipline. DCAF also ensures that the AF will not be abused in the political struggle for power in the state, i.e. to promote the party's power ambitions. When applying DCAF, it is essential that their functional parameters are preserved and that they can fulfil the tasks for which they were created and while they do not have the opportunity to threaten the democratic principles of the society for which they were intended. A balance must be achieved between political and military-professional intentions in the use of AF [10]. Therefore, the debate over the civil-military relationship inherently involves discussion about how these two actors interact [2].

The subjective definition of civilian control presupposes a conflict between civilian control and the need of military security. This was generally recognised by adherents of civilian groups who commonly asserted that continued military insecurity made civilian control impossible. Steps necessary to achieve military security are thus viewed as undermining civilian control. On the other hand, the effort to enhance civilian control in the subjective sense frequently undermined military security. If civilian control is defined in the objective sense, however, no conflict exists between it and the goal of military security. Indeed, just the reverse is true.

The question is what conditions are likely to maximize military professionalism and objective civilian control. The answer depends upon the relation between the two levels of civil-military relations. On the power level, the key issue in the power of the officer corps relative to civilian groups within society. On the ideological level the key issue is the compatibility of the professional military ethic with the political ideologies prevailing in society. On the one hand, criteria are needed by which to measure military and civilian power. On the other hand, some notion is required as to where the professional ethic fits into the spectrum of political opinion [8].

The creation of the national security policy is decisive in the mentioned relations [3]:

- there is rarely clear policy guidance,
- the process is iterative rather than linear,
- political decisions are rarely timely,
- mutual trust is not automatically conferred and is the result of personal relationships built over time,
- civilian and military leaders need each other,
- the civil-military divide neglects strategy.

The application of the principle of political control over the AF is visible even in dictatorial regimes, where the political representation of the state is not a product of the democratic electoral system, but the dictates of the ruling party. Special case is in countries in which the AF continue to dominate the political system. Governments can use the AF to contain riots or protests. In functioning democracies, the police perform this task. Situations in which governments resort to the AF to quell riots and protests indicate either that these riots and protests ran out of control, or they point to the autocratic nature of the incumbents [4].

Although there is no universally valid model for ensuring DCAF, there are generalized principles of democratic control, the content of which is:

- a) Constitutional (legal) guarantee of the subordination of the AF to the political bodies of the state with a clear definition of the constitutional bodies' competence of the legislative and executive power in political management matters of the AF. It represents a process in which the constitutional bodies, within the scope of their competence, decide on the use of the AF, on the allocation of resources (human and financial) for the needs of the AF, and within the defined scope they control their activities. In individual states, there are differences in the competence of the parliament, the head of state and the government in the cited matters, and it is basically defined in accordance with the power traditions and political culture of the respective states. For example, fundamental differences in the powers of the president and the government stem from the applied system of governance (state with presidential or parliamentary democracy).
- b) Combined representation of civilian and military personnel in the structure of the Ministry of Defence with a predominance of civilian personnel in conceptual and management positions, including the position of Minister of Defence. The purpose of this measure is that the solution of military-political matters such as the AF profiling was the responsibility of civilian management staff, and military personnel acted more in the role of advisors. Such allocation of competences is intended to prevent uncritical, military-biased opinion in the cited matters. An important prerequisite for the application of this principle is the stabilization of civil servants in key management positions and their managerial competence. The possible inclusion of lay people in management positions (in matters of the AF functioning) creates the possibility of promoting incompetent opinions and realizing their ambitions at the expense of the AF through their legally guaranteed management competences. They can thus create prerequisites for a serious

reduction in the functionality and efficiency of the AF. It is possible to counter this by introducing a system of military-theoretical training of civilian employees to the extent that corresponds to the requirement that the manager knows the object of management to the extent that corresponds to his management competencies.

- c) Parliamentary supervision over the development and the deployment of the AF to ensure the legitimacy of the AF. The principle of "parliamentary supervision" is based on the basic principle of democracy, which is the right of citizens to control the exercise of state power. Citizens exercise their authority over public affairs through elected representatives who have the duty to control how power institutions are created and used. Accordingly, the parliament is the most important subject of democratic control of the AF. For this purpose, the parliaments of democratic states have created special bodies in the form of a specialized committee for the affairs of the AF. Parliamentary supervision over the development and the deployment of the AF is generally based on the scope of Parliament:
- approve the state budget, check its implementation,
 - decide on the declaration of war if the state is attacked or this results from obligations from international agreements on joint defence against attack, and after the end of the war on the agreement of peace,
 - express consent to send the AF units out of own territory,
 - express consent to the presence of foreign AF units on own territory.
- d) Maximum transparency of the AF and their accessibility to the media represent important elements of the process of building trust between civil society and the AF. In this process, a significant role is played by the periodic publication of the so-called "White Papers on Defence". It is an analytical-conceptual document in which, based on a rigorous analysis of the current state of defence assurance and the AF readiness, the principles, direction, priorities and basic guardrails for the further development of the defence sector are defined. In this context, the "White Paper on Defence" represents a source of data for defence planning and, at the same time, a tool for communication between the Ministry of Defence and citizens. By its nature, it has the ambition to gain the understanding and support of the wider professional and lay public for the tasks and needs of guaranteeing the defence of the state, including the development of the AF.

After the end of the "Cold War", the issue of DCAF became part of the complex transformation of the AF of both "traditional" democratic states and post-communist states. The mentioned transformation manifests itself:

- strengthening the political-military nature of the Ministry of Defence and respecting the autonomy of commanding bodies in military-professional matters,
- changes in the mission of the AF by adding a "peace-making mission" in the form of establishing peace, building peace and maintaining peace to the traditional "war mission" in the sense of achieving victory over the enemy in a general war. Developmental trends in the global security environment indicate that the importance of the "peace-making mission of the AF" will increase and the importance of their traditional mission will stagnate or decline in proportion to the decrease in the probability of the outbreak of war between sovereign states,
- structural changes in the sense of an overall reduction in the number of soldiers and basic types of military equipment, together with overall professionalization and the generation of new, non-traditional capabilities such as civil-military cooperation capability (CIMIC), which is frequently applied in the entire spectrum of peace operations,
- technical and technological progress in armaments (introduction of new sophisticated types of armaments and information technologies into the AF).

International security organizations, in an endeavour to unify the democratization efforts of member states, have adopted several initiatives in which they encourage a democratic approach to the creation and use of AF and identify general norms and procedures in the field of their democratic control.

A general overview of the initiatives of international organizations in the field of identifying standards of democratic control of AF is presented in Table 1. Despite their insufficient enforceability (absence of sanctions for violations), they have an undeniable benefit in unifying the views of member states on the issue of mechanisms for ensuring DCAF.

Table 1.
Initiatives of international organizations in the field of DCAF

Organization	Focus of the initiative	Contained in document
UN	A call to the UN member states to encourage the development of democracy by, among other things, guaranteeing that the AF will remain subordinate to the democratically elected civilian government	UN General Assembly Resolution 55/96 on promoting and consolidating democracy (2000)
	Recommendation to UN member states to apply exhaustively defined principles of democratic control of the AF, police and other security forces	Human Development Report 2002
OECD	Detailed specification of politically binding standards of democratic control of military, paramilitary and	Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994)

	security forces as well as intelligence services and police	
NATO	The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, in which one of the five objectives is to ensure democratic control of the AF	Partnership for Peace Framework Document (1994)
EU	The Copenhagen criteria for joining the EU include Legal responsibility of the AF, police and security services	Agenda 2000, § 9

Source: own work

The most important of the mentioned initiatives can be considered the OSCE initiative contained in the document "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security" published in 1994. This politically binding document concerns not only the democratic control of the AF, but all intervention institutions of the security sector (police and other armed security forces).

The Table 2 identifies a set of standards of democratic control, which can be divided into international standards (applied at the level of the signatory states of the Code) and national standards applied at the level of the AF.

Table 2.

Basic international and national standards in the field of political-military aspects of security

International standards	National standards
Application of the principle of solidarity - support for joint response if agreed standards and principles are violated	Political management and control of the AF and the armed security forces of the state should be carried out through constitutionally elected bodies with democratic legitimacy
The maintenance and use of the AF must be in accordance with international law, i.e. in accordance with international agreements regulating numbers of the AF, ways and means of conducting armed conflict and the protection of victims of these conflicts	Limiting spending on armaments, the defence budget approved by law, transparency and public access to information about the AF
Maintaining the military potential within the limits of military sufficiency for the need of individual or collective defence	Consideration in laws and regulations of the rights and obligations of military personnel, ensuring the exercise of human rights and freedoms by military personnel in accordance with service requirements
Application of democratic principles of decision-making about the military capabilities of the state	Political neutrality of the AF, adoption and application of measures against accidental or unauthorized use of the AF
Deployment of the AF on the territory of other states only with their consent and in accordance with international law	Deciding on the use of AF to ensure national security in accordance with the constitutional framework

Source: own work

The "Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces" plays a particularly important role in the field of consulting services. It is an international organization founded in October 2000 on the initiative of the Swiss government, operating in accordance with Swiss laws. 61 countries of the world are represented in the "foundations", including Switzerland. The governing body of the foundation is the DCAF Board with about 100 experts. They collaborate with international organizations, such as the UN, NATO, AU, EU, and OSCE [29].

The centre collects information and conducts research to identify problems, collect experience and propose best practice in the field of democratic control of the security forces. Through practical work programmes, the centre provides its expertise and support to all stakeholders, particularly governments, parliaments, military institutions, international organisations, non-governmental organizations and academics.

6. Conclusions

It was found that in democratic states there is a legislative framework for the establishment, control and deployment of the AF. Civil-military relations must be linked to security and to democratization. However, each state has its peculiarities. Their mutual understanding is important especially in multinational operations. This can help in reducing differences of opinions and in achieving both political synergy and military interoperability.

Security is a complex issue in democratic states as well as in the states with some form of authoritarian regime. Security in this context implies the only (external/national defence) role for the military in democratic and dual (internal/public safety and external/national defence) role for the military in authoritarian regime. In transition states with weak civilian control, discussion of these roles runs the risk of challenging the status quo, in the absence of specific attempts to reduce the armed forces' role in internal policing. Coups d'état or undue military pressure on the government could result.

Accordingly, a more propitious setting for civilian control of the armed forces must be consciously built. There is tension between the need to have the military focus on its mission of external security (notably where history and constitutional provision press the armed forces into internal security activities) and the need to have the military fill the gap where government capacity to deliver services or maintain internal security is low.

This paper can assist both civilian and military officials in understanding their place in civil-military relations and their competencies in managing the armed forces. The concept of civilian control of the professional military in the democratic states is strongly given. The concept of the subordination of the military to civilian control ensures the continued adherence of democratic principles. Mentioned principles produce impassioned discussion on both (military and civilian) sides. The primary question in the past was: what pattern of civil-military relations to create. Nowadays primary question is where the balance between impact of civilian nonprofessional decisions (in military point of view) and impact of military professional influence to political decision makers is.

Small countries (such as Slovakia) can learn several lessons from global players efforts to create functional civil-military relations. While conceptual and legal frameworks for civil-military relations in some small countries have been taken over and adapted for one's own needs, they need to be fully implemented and tested. Some additional efforts are required for better delineation and coordination for all stakeholders to the civil-military relations. Social awareness of the importance of creating firm rules requires more attention. The preparation of military as well as civilian personnel working in defense sector is particularly important. Extremely important is also preparation of civilian decision-makers who are part of mentioned processes only for short time (election period).

Despite some predictions, it is not certain which direction civil-military relations will take. Only the future will tell whether the military-professional aspect will be strengthened and respected when setting strategic goals, or whether the aspect of political responsibility will be more enforced. It appears that the evaluation of the mentioned aspects will be a never-ending process and further research is needed.

References

1. **Cottey A.** Civil-Military Relations and Democracy in the New Europe. In OSCE Yearbook 2007, Baden-Baden 2008, pp. 281-295
2. **Krupski K. F.** Who's the Boss? Defining the Civil-Military Relationship in the Twenty-First Century. In Military Review. January-February 2023, Vol. 103, No. 1, pp. 26-33.
3. **Rapp W. E.** Civil-Military Relations: The Role of Military Leaders in Strategy Making. In Parameters. Vol 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2015): pp. 13–26.
4. **Elischer S.** Contemporary Civil-Military Relations in the Sahel. 2019, Paris: OECD Publishing. -30p.
5. **Dudzevičiūtė G.** Military Human Potential in the Context of Defence-Growth Relationship: Evidence from the Baltic States. In Challenges to National Defence in Contemporary Geopolitical Situation 2022 (2022), no. 1, 186-194, DOI 10.47459/cndcgs.2022.23
6. **Petraitis D.** Military Organization's Role and Place in the Recent Russia (Russian Militocracy). In Challenges to National Defence in Contemporary Geopolitical Situation 2022 (2022), no. 1, 113-128, DOI 10.47459/cndcgs.2022.14
7. **Pantev P.** Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Security Sector. 2005, Sofia: Procon. -144 p.
8. **Huntington S. P.** The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 1985, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. -534 p.
9. **Gray C. S.** Strategy for Chaos. Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History. 2002, London: Frank Cass Publishers. -310 p.
10. **Lynn J. A.** Battle. A History of Combat and Culture. From Ancient Greece to Modern America. 2003, Colorado: Westview Press. -399 p.
11. **Balsys P.** Values and identity of contemporary military officer in the context of national security. In Challenges to National Defence in Contemporary Geopolitical Situation 2020 (2020), no. 1, 182-188, DOI 10.47459/cndcgs.2020.23
12. **Rana R.** Contemporary challenges in the civil-military relationship: Complementarity or incompatibility? In IRRIC. September 2004, Vol. 86, No. 855, pp. 565-591.
13. **Steed B.** Armed Conflict. The Lessons of Modern Warfare. 2003, New York: Ballantine Books. – 286 p.
14. **ICRC.** International Humanitarian Law Databases. Available at: <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977>
15. **FindLaw.** U.S. Code - Unannotated Title 10. Armed Forces. Available at: <https://codes.findlaw.com/us/title-10-armed-forces/>
16. **MOČR.** Zákony v působnosti Ministerstva obrany. Available at: <https://mocr.army.cz/dokumenty-a-legislativa/zakony-v-pusobnosti-mo-172/>
17. **MOSR.** Zákony v působnosti Ministerstva obrany Slovenskej republiky. Available at: <https://www.mosr.sk/zakony-v-posobnosti-ministerstva-obrany-slovenskej-republiky/>
18. **UK Parliament.** The Convention and Bill of Rights. Available at: <https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/parliamentaryauthority/revolution/overview/billofrights/>
19. **Stojar R., Fučík J., Frank L.** Wars Without Soldiers and Casualties or Victories in Hearts and Minds? In Modelling and Simulation for Autonomous Systems. MESAS 2019. 2019, Vol. 11995, pp. 372 – 378.
20. **Świętochowski N.** Broń nieśmiercionośna jako środek umacniania bezpieczeństwa państwa. 2018, Poznań: FNCE. – 329 p.

21. **Kompan J., Hrnčiar M.** The Security Sector Reform of the Fragile State as a Tool for Conflict Prevention. In *Politické Vedy*. 2021, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 87-107.
22. **Ivančík R.** Security Theory: Security as a Multidimensional Phenomenon. In *Vojenské reflexie*. 2021, Vol. XVI, No. 3, pp. 32-53
23. **ICRC.** The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols>
24. **Gubáš F.** Health Security in the European Union. In *Science & Military*. 2014, Vol. 9, No 1, pp. 58-62.
25. **Varecha J.** Overdimension of the curriculum as an obstacle to achieving the quality of the teaching process. In *IATED*, 2022. pp. 4316-4320.
26. **Petrufová M., Belan L.** Quo vadis? The process of education, preparation and training of cadets - leadership in the Armed Forces Academy of gen. M. R. Stefanik. In *IATED*, 2022. pp. 4290-4300.
27. **Masár M., Brezina D., Hudáková M.** Analysis of risk management education at universities in EU countries. In *ICERI 2019 Proceedings*. IATED, 2019. p. 3726-3735.
28. **Petrauskaite A., Kazlauskaite Markeliene R.** National Security, Values and Postmodern Society. In *Challenges to National Defence in Contemporary Geopolitical Situation 2018* (2018), no. 1, 121-127, DOI 10.47459/cndcgs.2018.18
29. **DCAF.** Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. Available at: <https://www.dcaf.ch/about-us#>

Disclaimer/Publisher's Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of CNDCGS 2024 and/or the editor(s). CNDCGS 2024 and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.