

Cross-Cultural Comparisons for the Analysis of Disinformation in a Geopolitical Context: Case of Ukraine

Yuliia Turchenko^{1,2*}

¹Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine,

²Department of Political Economy, King's College London, United Kingdom

Correspondence: *yuliia.turchenko@gmail.com

Abstract

Cross-cultural comparisons are a valuable tool for analysing disinformation in a geopolitical context due to the increasing interconnectedness of the world and the spread of information across different cultures and societies. By examining how disinformation campaigns manifest and are perceived in various cultural contexts, researchers can gain insights into the underlying motives, tactics and effects of such campaigns.

Disinformation has become a systemic challenge to society due to a combination of disruptive technological, political and sociological transformations of social spheres in a very short period. In addition, the geopolitical zeitgeist, which focuses on the vulnerability of democracies to structural changes in the security order and the risks of global interdependence, reinforces the tipping point effect.

KEY WORDS: *Cross-cultural comparison, geopolitical context, disinformation, war, information.*

Citation: Turchenko, Y. (2024). Cross-Cultural Comparisons for the Analysis of Disinformation in a Geopolitical Context: Case of Ukraine. In Proceedings of the Challenges to National Defence in Contemporary Geopolitical Situation, Brno, Czech Republic, 11-13 September 2024. ISSN 2538-8959. DOI 10.3849/cndcgs.2024.178.

6. Introduction

Cross-cultural comparisons are a valuable tool for analysing disinformation in a geopolitical context due to the increasing interconnectedness of the world and the spread of information across different cultures and societies. By examining how disinformation campaigns manifest and are perceived in different cultural contexts, researchers can gain insights into the underlying motives, tactics and effects of such campaigns.

Disinformation has become a systemic challenge to society due to a combination of disruptive technological, political and sociological transformations of social spheres in a very short period. In addition, the geopolitical zeitgeist, which focuses on the vulnerability of democracies to structural changes in the security order and the risks of global interdependence, reinforces the tipping point effect.

Disinformation, mis- or misleading information, is an ever-developing phenomenon, that affects a large share of the public. Driven by the digital age, it is mainly spread online by state and non-state actors which complicates the battlefield by necessitating the inclusion of personalization techniques within the tactical arsenal. There are numerous classification systems in existence, if we are to evaluate disinformation from an ideological point of view, it would be tough to distinguish between misinformation and differently slanted interpretations due to the indefinability of truth within historical or opinion-based topics [2].

1.1. Background of Cross-Cultural Comparisons

The very concept of how people understand and respond to disinformation is different from one individual to another. Cross-cultural researchers state that different people's perceptions about events that pose traditional questions constitute various "truths" and can be mutually unintelligible to one another. In particular, communication as one type of crucial information factor of influence is particularly receptive to influences of social and cultural self-learning-cognition and information processing among people of different societies. Political communication systems and traditions are themselves different depending on the country, which is expressed in the different types of communication as control forms, audiences, and political actors of possibilities and restrictions that can be implemented.

The development of the Internet has led to the rapid spread of disinformation, thereby giving rise to what has been termed an ‘information warfare’. Disinformation is a specific type of false and misleading information that is spread, without any formerly contained intentions in mind, for ideological, political or economic manipulation. The more the Internet and related electronic media products and services provided opportunities to access disinformation, the more they became tools of informational influence and the so-called propaganda-building strength. According to recent studies, people who receive news primarily through social media express higher levels of concern about ever-increasing disinformation than those receiving news from other sources [3]. Two of three individuals doubt the ability to recognize misinformation themselves and understand the above-mentioned definition. Indeed, the Internet and social media are now an integral part of informational waves that have an impact on all the limiting parameters of disinformation, including who is disinforming who, about what, and for what.

1.2. Importance of Analyzing Disinformation in a Geopolitical Context

In 2007, Estonian government and business websites experienced cybernetic attacks which paralyzed the functioning of many web pages and services. As a response, Tallinn declared that Russia’s government was behind the attacks, and ever since, the term “cybernetic weapon” has appeared in official documents and statements released by numerous state officials. The pro-Russia disinformation and propaganda ecosystem often includes news outlets and websites, as well as ordinary users, bloggers, public figures, and opinion leaders. Kremlin-funded network Russia Today is often required to give a platform to Ukrainian interests or to convey aspects of Ukraine positively. Given the failures of the Busse-Orban Commission, the language of neutrality and apoliticism in European media, and the Cold War Shatter Zone created by demagogic domestic and sub-state actors alike, disinformation is an old, new thing in the International System. European online media pathologies, in particular, are many, and they fall outside the gamut of disinformation as defined by the EU. They can be summarized, however, under the three of Mearsheimer’s outcomes [4].

In the online world, the lines between news and disinformation often become blurred. Both the Russian government and the Ukrainian government had incentives and opportunities to push false narratives in the wake of the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 crash in 2014 and during geopolitically charged events. Disinformation is a political tool used by Moscow and Kyiv, and it exists in both Ukrainian- and Russian-language contexts [5]. The disinformation ecosystem of Ukraine must be viewed as interconnected for the three following reasons: first, the level of knowledge of the Ukrainian and Russian language is very high in both countries; second, the two countries’ often intertwined histories lead to a situation where disinformation often becomes internalized as information; and finally, disinformation is produced by both sides of the conflict in the Ukrainian and Russian languages and directed at very similar audiences. Russia’s role in the disinformation war in Ukraine—and the protection of the information space with anti-Russian legislation—is a common target of Russian disinformation. The Ukrainian government’s approach to labelling of Russian disinformation is creating internal information filters in Ukrainian society [6].

2. Methodology

Corpus Construction [1]. The goal is to construct ideologically engaged pro-Russian and anti-Russian corpora and intend difficulty to distinguish between them. Corpora with implicit, oppositional perspectives are primarily intended to be used for studying propaganda, i.e., as resources for analysis of “informational warfare.” Methods for corpus construction are algebraic models for the estimation of word distribution similarity and an educated guessing process as a method for quality control. Sources have been selected as a consequence of geopolitical strategy postures, such as supporting positions of Russia in the current conflict zone or Europe-aligned informational policy or geopolitical balance. Through such selection, the dataset has become somewhat partially geo-politically biased, i.e., some sources dislike Russia, while others primarily cover informational issues and feature news about Russian military, political or social interests as well. Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Insights [7]. Combining the qualitative process of media coding with the computational processing of textual data allows us to combine both the distinct benefits of quantitative research (allowing a representative view of textual data to emerge) and qualitative research (providing contextualized, situated interpretations of that data). This is a valuable synergy for geopolitical disinformation studies given the relationship between subtle framing elements of articles and overt news framing narratives. Thus, it makes sense to combine both modes of analysis in this domain. Computational content analysis creates automated procedures that analyze content, while manual content analysis focuses on human experts who are engaged in a systematic procedure for analyzing message content. Existing research combines qualitative and computational approaches in news studies.

Media Ecosystems on Global and Local Levels [8]. Over the last several years, social media and search engines have served as platforms not just for information, but for manipulated information, disinformation and propaganda. Social media’s business model, which encourages content to spread further and faster by encouraging “clicks,” is often understood to be an exacerbating factor in the information pollution that is present online. The global information ecosystem means that false information and erroneous journalistic coverage in one country can quickly spread to others. That does not mean that on-the-ground data collection and analysis cease to be important: On the contrary. However, it means that supplementing with global data and content analysis becomes increasingly critical.

2.1. Selection of Cross-Cultural Comparison Approach

The comparative method seems to be the handiest way to analyse the layperson's disinformation believability in terms of the role of traditional news media, levels of Facebook use, and conspiratorial beliefs about the conflict in Ukraine. The work is innovative by introducing two important variables in comparative political science: confidence and optimism people hold in the mediation capabilities of classic journalistic storytelling along with disinformation content [9]. There is also a lack of cross-national comparisons in the context of disinformation believability because of the short period from the beginning of the Russian-Ukraine war. Cross-cultural comparisons can be conducted using different approaches, and one of these is the comparative historical approach. The reason for examining historical context stems from the necessity of understanding the effect and the depth of the path and period dependencies among the nations. Despite its benefits, the comparative historical approach was not chosen due to the lack of accessible data in all countries and under all historical circumstances. Consequently, the cross-sectional approach was chosen for this study. This approach is advantageous also in terms of measuring and comparing international differences. Political science literature has also used a longitudinal approach to observing sustainability and change over time across nations. A short period from the beginning of the war was available for both of the method mentioned above, and a multiwave strategy was not possible. These facts narrowed the choice to the cross-sectional approach.

The rapid spread of fake news across different regions has forced media and political scientists to grasp convincedness about the key factors at play – amount, target group, intensity, channel, et cetera [3]. The issue of disinformation has become even more critical by wrangles over the Russian-Ukraine war. The following research in its turn seems to be incomplete without consideration of its findings beyond the borders of Ukraine to provide a comprehensive outcome. This study advances cross-national comparison of disinformation in a geopolitical context with a focus on Ukraine. Aim of the paper is to discover differences named in each theory by providing an example from the case of the Russian-Ukraine conflict [6].

2.2. Data Collection and Analysis Techniques

The main method of disinformation was its natural inclusion in the mass of news without proper verification of facts. The general impression was created that its volume and frequency had already decreased, however, concluding based on primary data should be cautious, since disinformation is a very peculiar phenomenon, even in the case of its operators.

At the next step, a search and analysis of relevant articles, as well as monitoring of information flows (presidential Facebook pages, main news agencies, Twitter), were conducted. Requests for which disinformation could be disseminated were divided into three directions: the internal one - the Republic of Ukraine, the near (close) foreign one - the countries of Western Europe, near, close the European Union, away foreign - distant sector, generally Asia, America (North, Central, South), Oceania, Africa. So, the analysis and monitoring of information were carried out over several years. The sources of disinformation gradually changed from the Russian Federation mainly to local, predominantly Ukrainian ones. Each direction was characterized by its specifics: for Ukraine - the entire mass media field, for the next foreign - in particular, official pages of states and political leaders, news agencies that are spread in Ukraine, and away foreign - societies of countries.

The main idea of the article to analyze the structure of disinformation in the geopolitical context of different countries. There are have recent conflicts with the Russian Federation [5]. Kazakhstan, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Kyrgyzstan, and Poland were chosen for the analysis [10]. About 80 articles covering the Russian-Ukrainian conflict since 2014 have been reviewed, highlighting the key elements of topics that have been attacked with disinformation. After that, we identified 5 dominant topics: the Ukrainian crisis, the MH17 disaster, the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, the rights of Russian citizens in the Baltic States, and Ukraine as a threat to the linguistic identity of Russians in Ukraine [11].

3. Case Study: Ukraine

One insight from our study that is crucial for policy implications is that the contemporary disinformation campaign on Ukraine, though repackaged, was started by a Russian disinformation campaign in the 1930s aimed at Ukraine's original attempt to gain independence from the Soviet Union, similar to what is happening now in its attempts to achieve independence from Russia now [12].

There are three interlinked threads in our analysis: 1) Ukraine and Ukraine's fraught history with Russia, and how it is remembered; 2) the Soviet disinformation campaign, when Ukraine threatened to secede from the Soviet Union in the early 1930s; 3) anniversaries and other presentations of history. Indeed, Putin and Trump during their first-ever meeting in 2017 both referred to their understanding of Ukrainian-Russian history. In this context, much of the Russian disinformation campaign against Ukraine is viewed through the lens not only of political reasons but also of historical and cultural reasons. These motives, in turn, cannot be disentangled from an analysis of Russian domestic and international politics in the resisting of minority cultures. Understanding eight decades of disinformation, including the Soviet and Russian versions, is indispensable to unmasking what the New York Times called "a week of wholesale mythologizing" that reached from Moscow to Silicon Valley.

The disinformation campaign surrounding the Ukraine Crisis and its annexation by Russia provides a rich context for testing theories and hypotheses from the existing literature on disinformation. We demonstrate how to use spatiotemporal

analytics to uncover patterns in the spiral circulation of false and true narratives about the annexation of Crimea. This research can help policymakers understand Russian information operations and strategic communication activities and tailor interventions in response. Russia's disinformation campaign justified the annexation of Crimea by spotlighting Ukraine's involvement with fascists and stereotyped Ukrainians as "nationalistically obsessed with the past" [14]. Subsequently, a lot of articles were written by news organizations, and bloggers, and automatically-generated content that shared on social media. Researchers of Putin's disinformation campaign have largely focused on the Russian diaspora's use of established social media, but we find that it had more success on Facebook. This is due to the demographics of those who came by and engaged with these materials: those sharing Russian disinformation are disproportionately older Americans, many of whom may not use Twitter.

Misinformation, and especially disinformation, is a crucial global and interdisciplinary problem that has gained significant attention from both academic and practitioner communities. Academically, the problem has given rise to several issues of interest to computer science, communications, and information sciences [15]. Previous studies have looked into the spread and impact of true and false information, Sarah Amdor et al. [13] the factors that influence the spread of information, and the effectiveness and intent of fact checks and debunks. Practitioner communities have focused predominantly on how to recognize false information at scale and how to debunk information quickly and effectively. Despite the attention that the problem of mis- and disinformation has garnered, we still know little about the factors that lead to the widespread and sustained belief in false news/narratives.

3.1. Overview of the Geopolitical Context in Ukraine

Due to the increase of hybrid threats and the EU's weak political support for the Association Agreement with Ukraine, such geopolitical reality became evident. The Ukrainian government does not have opportunities to mobilize wide public support for its reform that occurred in 2010-2019. Ukraine started to react to its public trust-shaped crisis when the Kremlin's expected victory in the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election was postponed. The Ukrainian leadership determined NATO membership and resistance to the Russian World's normative or ideational security is national security (Hartmann et al., 2019). Initially, President Volodymyr Zelensky acted with caution towards the pro-Western direction his country had taken. Instead eastern hypercritical foreign and domestic policy was formed regarding Russia. The geopolitical campaign was mainly targeted the European and American digital public opinion with two goals to be achieved: to gain international and domestic political support and reparations and also a wider use of dis- and mis-information in Russian-speaking information spaces to destabilize Russia to make it become a second order actor in the world.

The strategic failure of Russia and the United States stemmed from the inability of the deferred security architecture to adapt to the changes in the global military-political situation, including those related to the changes in the troops numeral dynamics in the Northwest limits of Russia and NATO due to the eastern enlargement NATO and Ukraine [6]. The regions of Donetsk and Lugansk and Kherson are strategic area important for trade with Crimea. The Azov Sea regional depth has significant naval values for merchant and military ships, and we have two gas pipelines and two under-construction connections to Crimea. The Crimea Peninsula's strategic location in the Black Sea is also quite advantageous as a naval base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Being strategically important for the world and the name which Russia has been calling it, Crimea has been under the sovereign of the Russian Federation since 18 March 2014 thanks to the 16-March-2014 referendum.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Zbigniew Brzezinski doctrine of 1997, Ukraine was considered an independent geopolitical player by the United States, which encouraged its development. In Russia, the strategic bipartisan consensus on Russia's support for Ukraine and its independence continued in 1991-2014 [17]. However, during the Obama presidency, Washington began to abandon this course, while Russia showed willingness to use military force in the region. In 2014, this led to the annexation of Crimea by Russia, which, for the geopolitical context of the United States and Russia, became a new phase of confrontation.

3.2. Analysis of Disinformation Campaigns in Ukraine

The aim of this article is to present the similarities and differences in disinformation campaigns carried out using social media during geopolitical conflict in Ukraine, analyzed by means of mixed methods – qualitative, quantitative, both manual and algorithmic. Disinformation techniques (conspiracy theories, fake news, appeals to fear) were discovered through manual analysis of a selected dataset of posts. The content analysis was supplemented by presenting the number of followers and interactions achieved by posts containing disinformation narratives detrimental to national security, so as to assess their potential reach. The real and assumed intentions of the propagators and targets of fake news were reconstructed and compared and the scope of the abovementioned posts was estimated between March 21, 2022, the day of the declaration of the beginning of the special military operation on Donetsk by the Russian president, and April 15, 2022. The study concerns posts on selected Western and Russian social media, both in Russian and in English, Facebook and VKontakte included.

Disinformation, which is presented as information obtained through public sources and intended to mislead, has been inseparably linked with the military conflict between Ukraine and Russia [11]. According to the content analysis of Russian sources in Chinese publications, one of the narratives suggests that the war is waged by and between the ruling elites, and is not fueled by and does not claim people's lives [8]. Research carried out on the contents of posts of conspiracy nature translated from one of the foreign languages revealed that the authors urged to be critical, to effectively verify the sources

and to carefully select information channels at the outbreak of geopolitical conflicts [9]. The publications empirically demonstrate differences in the tone and sentiment in the narratives covering the same event by Western, Russian and Chinese state media. The significant number of fake Russian Facebook pages created to distribute disinformation propaganda focused on Ukraine and its NATO aspirations was detected and removed by the Facebook security team.

3.3. Cross-Cultural Comparison of Disinformation Tactics in Ukraine

The research discovered significant interaction between disinformation and debunks in absolute terms as well as in natural units. This indicated certain effectiveness of debunking retweets on traditional Twitter. There are six fundamentally distinct themes equally present in the engagement and activity of debunked disinformation and debunks in terms of real data. There is a logic to this and it is important to answer the fundamental question about the reasons and purposes of spreading disinformation. This can be seen as a stage for some states, particularly developed authoritarian regimes, to test the mass public including international in order to create handy grounds for more dangerous for international stability political moves and military initiatives aimed to seriously revise existing world order.

Ukraine has the most developed system for combating disinformation initiatives, but the general dilemma for it and Russia as well is whether they should be ideologically dominated or fact-checking-based. Other states would prefer a broad range of engagement to debunk disinformation rather than general fact-checking [18]. Disinformation should always be contrasted with real data. If it can obtain wider coverage than disinformation, then the effect of debunking will be greater. Scholars are welcome to operationalize these theories and to test their predictive power in different settings and contexts in various countries and regions of the world.

The origins of disinformation go back centuries and deeply differ according to the geo-cultural heritage of the state that uses it. For instance, Russian disinformation is rooted in the anti-Western propaganda of the Soviet Union and the USSR's antiglobalist slogans [15]. Ukrainian propaganda mostly focuses on the promotion of pro-European and pro-NATO ideas striving to contrast their advantages with diminished Russian projects. The characteristics and areas of usage of disinformation therefore greatly depend on the most perceptible threats to a state and its citizens, so they should differ [14].

4. Conclusion

In the conclusion, two main findings are noted. Firstly, the geopolitical conflict has a powerful impact on the acceptance of disinformation, not only in the case of the ruling party and its electorate but also on the entire Hungarian and Ukrainian population. This is an element that has not yet been substantially researched in the literature on disinformation. Additionally, the two countries compared mirror each other. Sometimes the same scenario, expressed in a different combination of disinforming components related to a given country and its geopolitics, is used to disinform the population. Nonetheless, in both countries, citizens are more affected by the local conflict - Hungarians by the conflict in Ukraine and Ukrainians by the conflict with Russia - than by the conflict between Hungary and Ukraine. Information about local events and activities by neighbouring states is very important, but also very scarce in the countries' media landscape.

The situation is very similar in Hungary, where the ruling conservative party has been in power since 2010. An attack on democratic institutions and freedoms later transformed into the deployment of disinformation in Hungary. According to many dailies and weeklies, Hungary is now an informational autocracy; the ruling party and its government are using all the propaganda and state media tools to serve the party and the government. Pro-government news outlets in Hungary also try to influence the public through disinformation; they lead systematic disinformation campaigns and broadcast pro-Kremlin propaganda [19].

Ukraine is currently one of the most important proving grounds for disinformation within the context of conflict, and our research included this Eastern European country as a case study. During the invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent armed conflict in the east of the country, a protracted information war began, in which both sides to the conflict waged a disinformation campaign, and all resources to inform the population, including the media, were weaponized.

In this research, we examined the issue of disinformation in the context of geopolitical conflicts, drawing on empirical research from Hungary and Ukraine. We focused on cross-cultural comparisons aimed at the discovery of contexts that increase the spread of false information and result in their acceptance [1].

Key findings from the cross-cultural comparison

A retweet is not necessarily an indication of real belief in or promotion of, the message being amplified. Many user interactions with, or consumption of, social media content are as passive as it is of sites. Items propagated by digital influence campaigns become important topics during a period. The pathways with validation servers are selected for hosting targeted campaign themes. They are also highly retweeted within a primary user community: the United States conservative community. While the power of a message to move through social networks and media sites is seen as valuable, the extent of this advocacy is engagement without diligence. These stories can be considered adversaries to only target audiences and the question of whether engagement is prolonged through shared attributes, ideology or some other cognitive process is open [ref: Additional Materials].

There are no hard and fast rules against inflating followers or friends but these will be taken into account as potential evidence along with others. Follow the primary parties to find that they are attempting to create broad political divisions in the United States. Further go through their direct sharing activity with the accounts to find that they are co-validating their activity [20]. People retweeted the Irish and American primary influence campaign Tweets but were also active in other

conversations. The minority of Americans who retweeted were still notable for their amplification of the account's narratives and key messages within the context of speaking to the European elections. However, the decision to stand up against the adversary's activity is one for the Spanish Government's authority.

The posts and interactions between many actually spread content and others have a significant number of interactions. Inside an echo chamber, information can become disguised as representative of external sources, and other users may be more likely to trust the information because it appears to be fact-checked and trusted by their network [4]. Stated that widespread American and similar campaigns embedded themselves in existing social movements to have an impact. Some believe themselves to be white Americans in their digital identities rather than being citizens of another country.

The path forward in developing whole-of-society solutions to adversarial propaganda, disinformation, and misinformation is uncertain. To do so, we will need to think critically about foreign authoritarian states' continued use of underhanded tactics - often with direct harmful consequences for the citizenry within the targeted country. Government, business, civil society, and non-profit decision-makers - individuals and organizations that wield technical, intellectual, financial, or structural power - will need to be at the forefront of this charge, offering resources, protection, and strong lines of defence from abroad and at home to help inoculate our societies from similar foreign deception in the future.

When users engaged with a protective message, they reported a higher level of thoughtfulness, perceived the issue as more newsworthy and believed the source to be more professional than in the absence of a protective message [21]. The article suggests that disinformation-related measures could address the format and the source of disinformation. Some scholars observe that in the CEE region, the lack of effective structures to counter disinformation in national languages contributes significantly to the level of exposure to disinformation, which also reinforces the effectiveness of motivated reasoning leading to belief in and sharing of misinformation. By expanding the spectrum of outlets and means for the dissemination of public diplomacy content, it is knowledgeable that more valid information can be made available to potential external audiences, which would naturally expose the falsehood content of disinformation, and mitigate the effectiveness of misinformation.

Implications for Understanding and Countering Disinformation in Geopolitical Contexts Over the last decade, disinformation, miscalculation, and misinformation have played unique and varied roles in arming conflicts and impeding the peaceful resolution of simmering geopolitical tensions. Russia's strategy of disinformation is aimed primarily at the neighbouring "Jewel in the Crown," Ukraine [1]. Noteworthy is the strategic significance attached to the anti-Ukrainian information warfare: No, Ukraine is not a part of NATO, nor the EU, nor an essential strategic partner of the United States or its allies. Nonetheless, Russian disinformation was used against it as if it posed a strategic hazard powerful enough to undermine the global political order. This hints at the expansionist nature of today's resurgent Russia, and the Kremlin's dogged pursuit of great power status at the doorstep of its neighbors [17].

References:

1. **Mazepus, H., Osmudsen, M., Bang-Petersen, M., Toshkov, D., & Dimitrova, A.** Information battleground: Conflict perceptions motivate the belief in and sharing of misinformation about the adversary. *PLoS One*. 2023; 18(3): e0282308.
2. **Ceron, W., Gruszynski Sanseverino, G., de-Lima-Santos, M. F., & G. Quiles, M.** COVID-19 fake news diffusion across Latin America. 2021. *Soc Netw Anal Min*. 2021; 11(1): 47.
3. **Esser, F., Pfetsch, B.** Comparing Political Communication: A 2023 Update. *SocArXiv*. January 27. doi:10.31235/osf.io/pq4yf.
4. **Lee Kirn, S. & K. Hinders, M.** Ridge count thresholding to uncover coordinated networks during onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. *Soc Netw Anal Min*. 2022; 12(1): 45.
5. **Mu, X., Liu, Y., Guo, L., Lin, J., & Ding, Z.** Energy-Constrained UAV Data Collection Systems: NOMA and OMA. 2019. arXiv:1910.01363v1 [cs.CL] 3 Oct 2019.
6. **Aguerri, J., Santisteban, M., & Miró-Llinares, F.** The fight against disinformation and its consequences: Measuring the impact of "Russia state-affiliated media" on Twitter. *SocArXiv*. April 23. 2022. doi:10.31235/osf.io/b4qxt.
7. **Dumitrescu, D. & Trpkovic, M.** The Use of Non-verbal Displays in Framing COVID-19 Disinformation in Europe: An Exploratory Account. *Front Psychol*. 2022; 13: 846250.
8. **W. A. Hanley, H., Kumar, D., & Durumeric, Z.** A Special Operation: A Quantitative Approach to Dissecting and Comparing Different Media Ecosystems' Coverage of the Russo-Ukrainian War. arXiv:2210.03016v4 [cs.CY] 31 May 2023.
9. **Pierri, F., Luceri, L., Jindal, N., & Ferrara, E.** Propaganda and Misinformation on Facebook and Twitter during the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. arXiv:2212.00419v2 [cs.SI] 20 Feb 2023.
10. **Corso, F., Russo, G., & Pierri, F.** A Longitudinal Study of Italian and French Reddit Conversations Around the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. 2024. p.10.
11. **Bin Zia, H., Ul Haq, E., Castro, I., Hui, P., & Tyson, G.** An Analysis of Twitter Discourse on the War Between Russia and Ukraine. arXiv:2306.11390v1 [cs.SI] 20 Jun 2023.
12. **M. Rice, N., D. Horne, B., A. Luther, C., D. Borycz, J., L. Allard, S., J. Ruck, D., Fitzgerald, M., Manaev, O., C. Prins, B., Taylor, M., & Alexander Bentley, R.** Monitoring event-driven dynamics on Twitter: a case study in Belarus. *SN Soc Sci*. 2022; 2(4): 36.

13. **Amador, S., Rapaport, P., Lang, I., Sommerlad, A., Mukadam, N., Stringer, A., ... & Livingston, G.** Implementation of START (STrategies for RelaTives) for dementia carers in the third sector: widening access to evidence-based interventions. *PLoS One*, 2021, 16(6), e0250410.
14. **Singh, I., Bontcheva, K., Song, X., & Scarton, C.** Comparative Analysis of Engagement, Themes, and Causality of Ukraine-Related Debunks and Disinformation. *arXiv:2212.07457v1 [cs.CY]* 14 Dec 2022.
15. **Rabb, N.** What is the disinformation problem? Reviewing the dominant paradigm and motivating an alternative sociopolitical view. *arXiv:2212.07457v1 [cs.CY]* 04 Dec 2023.
16. **Hartmann, M., Golovchenko, Y., & Augenstein, I.** Mapping (Dis-)Information Flow about the MH17 Plane Crash. *arXiv:1910.01363v1 [cs.CL]* 03 Oct 2019.
17. **J. Cull, N.** The war for Ukraine: reputational security and media disruption. *Place Brand Public Dipl.* 2023; 19(2): 195–199.
18. **Weiss, Kyle.** Seek Truth from Facts: How Foreign Disinformation Emerges from Domestic Propaganda. *SocArXiv*. August 21. doi:10.31235/osf.io/6qrn5. 2020.
19. **Faragó, L., Krekó, P., & Orosz, G.** Hungarian, lazy, and biased: the role of analytic thinking and partisanship in fake news discernment on a Hungarian representative sample. *Sci Rep.* 2023; 13: 178.
20. **Wang, S., Su, F., Ye, L., & Jing, Y.** Disinformation: A Bibliometric Review. *Int J Environ Res Public Health.* 2022 Dec; 19(24): 16849.
21. **Folkvord, F., Snelting, F., Anschutz, D., Hartmann, T., Theben, A., Gunderson, L., Vermeulen, I., & Lupiáñez-Villanueva, F.** Effect of Source Type and Protective Message on the Critical Evaluation of News Messages on Facebook: Randomized Controlled Trial in the Netherlands. *Journal of Medical Internet Research.* 2022. *J Med Internet Res.* 2022 Mar; 24(3): e27945.

Disclaimer/Publisher's Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of CNDCGS 2024 and/or the editor(s). CNDCGS 2024 and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.